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JURISDITION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sect. 78A-4-2103(2)(e) and Rules 3 and 4 of Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUE ONE: Did the District Court commit reversible eijror in allowing the case to go to
the jury when the State failed to establish any misleading statements made by the defendant that
could be made not misleading by any of the alleged omissions the State presented to the jury and
when the State failed to present any evidence of an offer, sale or purchase of a security for value.
This issue is discussed un Point One of the Argument.
Standard of Review: This is an issue of law reviewed for correctness. See State v.
MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, 84 P.3d 1171 (2004)
Preservation of the issue: The issue was preserved in the Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss (R. ???) and was also argued at the close of the State's case , Trial Transcript ("TT")
pp. 296-299). It was also argued in Closing Argument (TT pp. 372 - 396) and on the Motion to
Arrest Judgment. (R ???).
ISSUE TWO: Did the District Court commit reversible error in allowing the State's
expert, Mr. Hines, the Director of Enforcement for the Utah Division of Securities, present to the
jury an impermissible legal conclusion that the stock certificates given to Mr. Young and Mr.
Myers was security? This issue is discussed under Point Two of the Argument.
Standard of Review:

"The determination as to who qualifies as an expert witness and

the admissibility of the witness's testimony fall[s] within the discretion of the trial court," which
1

will not be reversed "[a]bsent a clear abuse of this discretion." Evan ex rel. Evans v. Langston,
2007 UT. App. 240, 166 P.3d 621 (2007) (first alteration in original).
Preservation of the Issue: This issue was preserved at the trial. (TT pp. 100,1149 and
360) and the Motion to Arrest Judgment (R. ???)
ISSUE #3:

Did the District Court commit reversible error in allowing the State to

present the jury an incorrect view of the law in violation of defendant's constitutional right to
due process, and making the application of the statute constitutionally vague, as applied to
defendant, and in violation of the constitutional separation of powers clause? This issue is
discussed under Point Three of the Argument.
Preservation of the Issue: This issue was preserved in the Motion to Dismiss (R???), TT
pp. 296-299 and the Motion to Arrest Judgment (R. ???)
ISSUE#4 Did the District Court commit reversible error when it allowed the
following irrelevant, inflammatory and prejudicial evidence to go to the jury:
A.
The evidence of the $50,000 trust deed was executed August 9, 2000, at
least 2 months after the alleged stock sale agreement, and there was no evidence that the
trust deed was in existence, nor was it a part of, nor did the trust deed had anything to do
with the August 9, 2000 agreement.
B.
The evidence that defendant promised to pay for 200 cows which were
delivered after the alleged stock sale agreement, and there is no evidence that the
defendant's alleged promise was part of, nor had anything to do with, the August 9, 2000
agreement.
C. The State's expert testimony of an IPO where the entire transaction did
not involve an IPO.
This issue is discussed under Point Four of the Argument.
1

MR. HARMON: Your Honor, again I'd like to pose an objection
record). The State continued to question about an IPO after the objection.
2

(Discuss at the bench off the

Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion by the trial court, State v. Bisner, 2001 UT
99, 37 P.3d 1073 (2001).
Preservation of the Issue: preserved in the Motion for Arrest of Judgment.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, CODE SECTIONS AND RULES
The provisions of the controlling law; constitution, statutes, and rules are attached in
Addendum:
Utah Constitution, Article V, Section 1
Utah Constitution Article VI, Section 1
Utah Code Ann. Sect. 61-1-1
Utah Code Ann. Sect. 78A-4-2-103(2)(e)
Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure:
Rule 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence
Rule 704, Utah Rules of Evidence
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This case represents perhaps the best reason why the judiciary is an independent branch
of the government, to guard and protect ordinary citizens from aggressive and overreaching
enforcement of the laws by the executive branch ("State"). The defendant, A. Paul Schwenke,
was charged with violating Utah Code Ann. Section 61-1-1(2) commonly referred to as "security
fraud". This statute prohibits anyone from offering, selling or purchasing security using untrue
statements of material facts, or making misleading statements of material fact and omitting to
state material facts necessary to make the misleading statements, not misleading. The State
claims that Schwenke violated this statute by selling stock of American Dairy.com to Mr. Young

and Mr. Myer in exchange for their dairy farm in Delta, Utah. The State's expert witness
testified to the jury that the American Dairy.com stock received by Mr. Young and Mr. Myers
was "security" under the code, Section 61-1-1(2).
According to the State, because Schwenke alledgedly sold security, he had a duty to
disclose everything a "reasonable prudent investor would want to know before they make their
decision in purchasing." TTp.90. Based on this view of the law, the State presented the jury
with at least 20 disclosures that Schwenke failed to make to Mr. Young and Mr. Myers. That is
the entirety of the State's security fraud claim. The State's view of the law, however, is clearly
erroneous. The plain meaning of Section 61-1-1(2) is a prohibition against offering, selling or
purchasing a security and telling untrue statements of material facts, or telling misleading
statements of material facts and omitting to tell material facts that would make the misleading
statements made, not misleading. Because of the State's erroneous view of the law, it failed to
show any misleading statements of material fact actually made by the defendant, and instead,
told the jury that Schwenke failed to disclose to Mr. Young and Mr. Myers at least 20 facts that a
reasonable prudent investor would have wanted to know. The State's erroneous view of the law
presented to the jury by its expert witness, Mr. Hines, a member of the executive branch, resulted
in Schwenke's wrongful conviction and imprisonment. Accordingly, the honorable court is
respectfully urged to correct the injustice inflicted on defendant and promptly reverse his
wrongful conviction.
Procedural History.
The defendant and a co-defendant, Jamis Johnson, were charged by Criminal
4

Information on April 4, 2005. The Information was later amended on October 24, 2005 (R ???).
The Amended Information charged Schwenke and Johnson with one count of securities fraud in
violation of Utah Code Ann. Section 61-1-1, and one count of theft by deception in violation of
Utah Code Ann. Section 76-6-405. Following a preliminary hearing, both Schwenke and
Johnson were bound over for trial on both charges. (R ???). Upon motion by co-defendant
Johnson, the cases were severed and proceeded to separately. Later, upon the State's stipulation
the charge of theft by deception in violation of 76-6-405 was dismissed. (R ???). Schwenke then
filed a Motion to Dismiss the charges because, among other grounds, the State has not stated any
misleading statements of material facts actually made by the defendant and the State's view of
the statute was erroneous. (R ???). The Motion to Dismiss was renewed at the end of the State's
case wherein the State opposed by stating its erroneous view of the law:
[GUNNARSON]:
. . . He [Schwenke] argued that there were no predicate
statements. I think we've had abundant testimony as to predicate statements and the
fact of obligations of disclosures, the fact that he was a promoter and the fact (inaudible)
even a promoter that put upon him the duty of all disclosures, which he breached. The
fact that he didn't — he brought up subjects such as risk ~
[THE COURT]
Well, promoter is not a defined term in the statute.
[GUNNARSON]
No, but (inaudible) definition that he's a control person, and a
control person has that according to Mr. Hines ~
[THE COURT]
Well, there's no — control person is not a defined thing in the
statute, either.
[GUNNARSON]
Well, true, but then the expert testimony has been that (inaudible)
if he is a control person and a promoter, and they have that duty to disclose. Beyond
that, Mr. Hines has testified, and it's obvious for the jury that there is an opening of the
door when he talked about risk. Once you talk about risk you better tell all the risks,
and that includes conflicts, that includes background. That includes the risk of the IPO.
As a matter of fact, the IPO was, in Hines' opinion, very probably would not have been
granted, and that's something they should have been told. So by opening the door and
talking about the IPO, he has to tell them the risks involved.
5

[THE COURT]
Go ahead, Mr. Schwenke.
[SCHWENKE]
I think it's interesting to hear all these terms being put forth. I
think the statute is pretty clear as to what is needed to be proven here, number one, there
should be a sale as they allege of American Dairy stock by fne, the defendant, to Mr.
Young and Mr. Myers. I believe the evidence does not show that I made that sale.
More importantly, the second element, not once —
[THE COURT]
Who made the sale then if you didn't?2
[SCHWENKE]
Well, the sale was as I believe the evidence was confirmed here,
there was idea there for a corporation to be formed for the farmers, and the farmers
owned it and the farmers —
{THE COURT]
Well, but it was your idea, wasn't it?
[SCHWENKE]
Correct, it was my idea. But there was no sale.
[THE COURT]
This wouldn't have all took place it it hadn't been for you.
[SCHWENKE]
Well, absolutely. As a matter of fact, it shouldn't even come to
place even right now at all, but I think what we really need to look at here is how easy
the statute is. It's not that complicated. It does not say anything at all about a promoter.
It doesn't say nothing about a control person. It says that I, the defendant, made a
material misrep —
[THE COURT]
Well, first of all, you made and untrue statement, and I — I think
they haven't pointed out any untrue statement, other than — you know, I guess — you
know, I guess it's arguable, but —
[SCHWENKE]
Except, your honor, I believe just from the plain meaning of the
second element that we're talking about here, they have the option to show untrue
statements or the second option. The fact that they relied on omissions, they — means
that they have not relied on untrue statements. They have elected to use omissions, which
is the second option on that second element — omissions. I believe the language is clear
enough that says, "omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make a statement
made not misleading," That means they must put on evidence that I made misleading
statements.
[THE COURT]
No. No. That's not what it says.
[SCHWENKE]
Well -[THE COURT]
It's that you omitted to make statements — material statements
that in light of the — under the conditions that you made them, whatever statement they
have, that there was low risk or that you were going to have an IPO, and —
[SCHWENKE]
What [THE COURT]
They're alleging the fact that you omitted to give, I guess,
background of yourself and Mr. Johnson, that that would — something that would be
important if there was going to be a successful IPO, or if there was - if this — the

The Court apparently already concluded , erroneously, that the issuance of American Dairy.com stock to Mr.
Young and Mr. Meyers was a "security transaction".
6

associated risk with them making this transaction.
[SCHWENKE]
I understand what you're saying, your Honor, but if I could just
make one more response to that. It's omit to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made. So that means there has to be a statement made.
[THE COURT]
That's true, there has to be a statement made.
[SCHWENKE]
And then the omission would make that statement not
misleading.
[THE COURT]

Uh-huh. That's right.

TTpp. 296-299.
The case was presented to the jury, notwithstanding, the Court agreed that the State did
not show any untrue statements, and agreed also that the State had to prove misleading
statements of material fact and omissions of material facts nec^scary tc r^ake those misleading
statements, not misleading. The jury convicted defendant on April 4, 2007 (R??7). The Court
denied defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment on ???? (R?9?). Defendant was sentenced on
???? to 0 to 5 years in prison. (R ???). The Notice of Appeal was filed on ???? (R??°). On ???
the case was remanded to the District Court to appoint new counsel. Mr. James K. Slaven, Esq.
was appointed counsel for Appellant on ????. (R ???). Mr. Slaven filed a motion to remand the
case to the District Court for a hearing to establish evidence critical to the defense that were not
produced at the trial as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel. (R ???). The court denied
the remand motion on 77777. (R7??) Please see a copy of the order with copies of some of the
documentary evidence that would have been produced on remand included in the Addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

Mr. Ronald Myers and Mr. James Young owned a dairy farm called Milk-King

Farm, LLC located at Delta, Utah. TT p. 118.
7

2.

Prior to the transaction, Mr. Myers and Mr. Young had a substantial loan with

Central Bank with the dairy and land as collateral. TT pp. 116-7.
3.

In or about July, 2000, a Mr. Duane Bitton, a cattle seller and broker, introduced

Mr. Young to Mr. A Paul Schwenke at a meeting in Fillmore, Utah. TT p. 119.
4.

Just prior to that meeting, the American Dairy.com, a Utah corporation, had been

incorporated by Victor Lawrence. American Dairy.com had never engaged in any business
prior to August 9, 2000 and had no bank or checking accounts. TT pp. 315-320.
5.

At the Fillmore meeting, A. Paul Schwenke outlined a proposal for several dairies

to combine and join a new shell corporation. Each dairy that joins the corporation would be
cleaned, painted and Internet equipment installed so the dairy and its operations could be viewed
over the Internet. When a sufficient number of dairies join the corporation, the shell could be a
viable entity to take to the stock market and raise funds for the participating dairies. TT pp.
121-123.
6.

Another meeting occurred on or about August 2, 2000 at the office of Mr. Victor

Lawrence in Salt Lake City, Utah. Mr. Young, Mr. Myers, Mr. Schwenke and Mr. Lawrence
were present, and at some point, all went downstairs to the separate office of Jamis Johnson. TT
p.132.
7.

At the August 2, 2000 meeting, a draft of an Agreement was reviewed. TT pp.

134-135.
8.

The Agreement generally transferred title of the dairy and farming equipment to

the American Dairy.com Corporation, and Mr. Young and Mr. Myers to receive 200,000 shares.
8

At the time of the Agreement Mr. Young and Myer became the only, or were the sole
shareholders of American Dairy.com. TT pp. TT p. 153 and pp. 239-240.
9.

At the August 2, 2000 meeting, Young did not recall exactly who were present

nor what was discussed. Myers expressed that Mr. Johnson told him that he was an attorney
with securities expertise, that it was possible to have a public offering under Schwenke's plan
with 15,000 cows and the stock could be offered at $4.00 to $8.00 a share. TT P. 227.
10.

Mr. Young and Mr. Myers desired to have this Agreement reviewed by their own

attorney and took the draft Agreement to their attorney in Delta, Utah, for review and advise. TT
pp. 143-4 and 237.
11.

Mr. Young and Mr. Meyer's attorney made revisions to the initial draft which

were incorporated into the final draft. The main revision was that Mr. Young and Mr. Myers
were to retain the right to buy back the dairy property and equipment for the 200,000 shares of
stockofAmericanDairy.com. TTpp. 237-8 and 259.
12.

The parties met again on August 9, 2000. Mr. Young and Mr. Myers first met

with A. Paul Schwenke and Victor Lawrence to review the final draft. Mr. James Young signed
the Agreement on behalf of Milk-King Farms, LLC, then the Agreement was taken to Mr.
Johnson's office where he signed it on behalf of American Dairy.com. TT pp. 221 and 239.
13.

After the Agreement was signed, two stock certificates were issued, one for

50,000 shares to Mr. Young and another for 150,000 shares to Mr. Myers pursuant to the terms
of the Agreement. TTp. 230.
14.

The testimony presented clearly demonstrated that Young and Myers were the
9

only shareholders of American Dairy.com, Inc. TT p. 181.
15.

In connection with the August 9, 2000 agreement a warranty deed was executed

by Milk-King Farms, LLC conveying the title of the dairy farm to American Dairy.com. TT p.
239.
16.

Mr. Young continued to operate the dairy and to control all aspects of the dairy

operations. Mr. Young continued to maintain any bank accounts and collect all incomes. TT pp.
182, 196-7 and 264.
17.

The State claimed that defendant failed to make the following disclosures to Mr.

Young and Mr. Meyers in connection with the August 9, 2000 agreement:
(1).
" . . . actual risk factors involved in the venture .. ." See TT pp.91-92
(2).
". . . minimum capitalization or the minimum amount of money you
need to collect to make this business work. . ."
See TT p.92
(3).
" . . . what happen to the money if minimum capitalization isn't
reached."
See TT p. 92.
(4).
" . . . the financial statements . . ."
See TT pp. 92 and 125
(5).
" . . . history of the principals of the company. . ." See TT p.92
(6).
" . . . history of the control person . .."
See TT pp. 92-93
(7).
" . . . competition in the market. . ."
See TT p. 93
(8).
" . . . the background of the CEO . . ."
See TT pp. 94 and 125
(9).
" . . . that there are no Financials . . ."
See TT p. 96
(10). " . . . history of any civil litigation, criminal litigation, regulatory
administrative actions of control person . . ." See TT pp. 96 and 151.
(11). " . . . tax lien [of control person] . . ."
See TT pp. 97, and 147,
(12). Control persons disbarment
See TT p. 101
(13). Judgment against Jamis Johnson
See TT p. 147
(14). Federal tax lien against defendant
See TT p. 148, 264 and
Exhibit #12
(15). Tax lien against Jamis Johnson
See TT p. 150 and Exhibits
#13,#14and#15
(16). Jamis Johnson's bar problem
See TT p.231
(17). Defendant's disbarment
See TT p.231, pp.272-274
(18). Tax liens against Johnson and defendant
See TT pp.231, 246, 264,
10

18.

266
(19).

Notice of Default in MNSTR case

Exhibit # 16

(20).

Giffen judgment against defendant

See TT pp 77-78, 146-155

Mr. Young testified that defendant did not make any misleading statements. See

TT pp. 194-195.
19.

Mr. Myers testified that defendant did not make any misleading statements. See

TT P. 266.
20.

Mr. Hine, the State's expert witness, admitted that the testimonies were that

defendant did not make any misleading or misstatements. See TT pp. 289-290.
21.

Mr. Hine testified that the stock certificates issued to Mr. Young and Mr. Myers

were security. See TTpp. 84-85, 286-288.
22.

Mr. Young testified and confirmed that the transaction was a change of form of

ownership from a limited liability company to a corporation. See TT p. 145.
23.

Mr. Young and Mr. Myers confirmed that the plan was for several dairy farms to

join, and only when enough farmers join would there be an effort to pursue an IPO. See TT pp.
121-122, 174-176, and 257-258.
24.

Mr. Young continued to control and operate his farm and collect all income and

pay expenses as he has always done prior to the agreement. See TT p. 182. The only change was
the dairy was cleaned, painted and equipped with Internet server, website and cameras for it to be
viewed live over the Internet. See TT pp. 189-190.
25.

The State claimed that defendant was the control person and promoter, and as

such had the duty to make the disclosures listed above in paragraph 28. See TT p.90.
11

26.

The State claimed that defendant took out a loan of $50,000.00 secured with the

farm, and pocketed the money. See TT pp. 163, 277-278. Mr. Young stated that he had no
knowledge if there was a $50,000.00 note, nor was there any money disbursed on the trust deed.
SeeTTp. 187.
27.

But for ineffective assistance of counsel, bank records and testimony from PDN

Investments would have established that only $12,500.00 was actually funded on the loan. And
notwithstanding, Mr. Young's denial of the loan, he personally received $7,500.00 and the
balance of $5,000.00 was paid on a $15,000 bill from cSave.net, LLC that cleaned, painted the
dairy farm, and installed the internet server, website and cameras throughout the dairy3 as
confirmed by Mr. Young at trial. See TT pp. 189-190. After the August 9, 2000 Agreement,
the State claimed that defendant told Mr. Young to buy 200 cows for the farm and the
defendant would pay for the cows. See TT p. 192.
28.

While Mr. Young claims that defendant was supposed to pay for the cows, he

acknowledged that defendant did not promise, nor had any obligation under the August 9, 2000
agreement to buy cows. See TT p. 192.
29.

According to the State, within 30 days after the August 9, 2000 agreement, the

cows were delivered to the farm, and during the next 30 days the cows were repossessed. See
TT pp. 243-244.

Appellant was denied a remand to establish evidence of the loan including copies of the disbursement checks
issued to Young and cSave.net. The order denying remand and copies of the checks to Mr. Young and csave.net are
provided in Addendum.
12

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
This brief provides legal arguments for reversal of defendant's conviction. Defendant
demonstrated under Point One that the State failed to establish a case for security fraud under
the plain meaning of the statute, Utah Code Ann. Section 61-1-1(2). The statute requires the
State to prove statements of material facts that the defendant made which were misleading. Then
the State must prove statements of material facts that the defendant did not make, but should
have made to make the misleading statements made, not misleading. Instead of following the
statute, the State argued that defendant was a control person and a promoter of American
Dairy.com, and as such, the defendant had a duty to disclose all information a "reasonable
prudent investor would want to know before they make their decision in purchasing." TT p.90.
Based on the State's erroneous view of the statute, it presented the jury with at least 20
disclosures that it claimed the defendant had a duty to make, but failed to do so. The State,
however, failed to establish any misleading statements made by defendant that could be made,
not misleading, by any of the alleged 20 omissions. Moreover, the stock transactions must be
for value, a required element of the definition of a security under Sect. 61-1-1, but the testimony
of the State's witness Mr. Young clearly confirmed that his receipt of American Dairy.com stock
was not for value but instead the transaction was merely changing the form of their company,
Milk King Dairy, LLC, a limited liability company, to the corporation American Dairy.com. No
money changed hands, Young and Myers maintained control of their equipment and dairy, the
bank accounts, the milk receipts, etc.
Under Point Two, it is shown that the State's expert, Mr. Hines improperly opined that
13

the stock of American Dairy.com, the only shares of which were owned by Mr. Young and Mr.
Myers themselves, is a security because Mr. Young and Mr. Myers testified that they expected
the stock to increase in value, they had the right to participate in profits, and they had the right to
vote. Mr. Hines impermissible legal conclusion is ground for the court to reverse defendant's
conviction, and the court is respectfully urged to do so.
Under Point Three, it is shown that the State's expert repeatedly stated the wrong
version of the statute as requiring disclosures of all information a reasonable prudent investor
would want to know rather than the limited disclosures required under the plain meaning of the
statute. By prosecuting its own version of the law rather than as enacted by the Legislature, the
State has violated defendant's constitutional right to due process. The State prosecution also
violates the separation of power clause of the constitution. The violations resulted in
defendant's wrongful conviction and the court is respectfully urged to correct this injustice and
reverse and set aside the defendant's conviction.
Under Point Four, it is shown that the conviction could have been the result of the State
presenting irrelevant, inflammatory and highly prejudicial evidence. The defendant was charged
with security fraud resulting from an alleged offer, sale or purchase of a security. The basis for
the charge is an agreement executed by and between Milk King Dairy, LLC and American
Dairy.com, on August 9, 2000. Accordingly, any alleged fraud in connection with this
agreement must have occurred on or before August 9, 2000. The two most inflammatory and
very prejudicial events in evidence presented to the jury, did not occur until after the agreement
was entered into on August 9, 2000, and both were misrepresented. The first is a claim that the
14

defendant borrowed and kept for himself $50,000.00 using the dairy farm as collateral. The only
evidence of the alleged loan was a 2nd trust deed for $50,000.00 dated October 4, 2000. There
was no evidence of a note, nor was there any evidence that the note was funded, and if it was
funded, who received the proceeds. More importantly, the alleged debt occurred two months
after August 9, 2000, the date of the alleged stock sale agreement. The second is the claim that
defendant promised to pay for 200 cows delivered to the dairy farm within 30 days after the
August 9, 2000 agreement. There was no evidence that defendant had any legal obligation to
pay for the cows, accordingly, even if he had promised to pay for them, it is not a crime and is a
promise without consideration.4 More importantly, both of the claims had no bearing or any
connection to the August 9, 2000 agreement. Additionally, the State's expert witness gave
highly inflammatory IPO testimony that was irrelevant and very prejudicial. Indeed, most of all
the testimony as to lack of disclosures was incorrectly presented as necessary disclosures in
connection with an IPO.
ARGUMENT
Point One
The State failed to establish a case of security fraud under the plain
meaning of the statute, Utah Code Ann, Sect 61-1-1(2).
The defendant was charged, convicted and imprisoned for violation of Utah Code Section
61-1-1 (2) which provides, in relevant parts as follows:
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of any
4

If a remand was granted , defendant would have shown that in a restitution hearing by former co defendant
Johnson, it was revealed that Young and Myers sold all the calves and the cows, though they did not own them,
making in excess of $70,000.00, kept all the milk proceeds in excess of $20,000.00 and did not pay feed suppliers.
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security, directly or indirectly to: . . . (2) make any untrue statement of a material
fact or omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statement made,
in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.
(Emphasis added).
The correct interpretation of this statute is at issue because the entirety of the State's case, as
shown below, is outside the purview of the statute. This court can review this statute for
correctness as a question of law. State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 796 (Utah 1991). Ward v.
Richfield, 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990). It is well settled that when faced with a question of
statutory construction, the court must first examine the plain language of the statute. Shultz v.
BMA of N. Am. Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1112, (Utah 1991); Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, iOu
(Utah 1989) (per curium).
Under the plain language rule, section 61-1-1(2) is clear and unambiguous that the State
must establish proof beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the defendant engaged in an offer, sale
or purchase of a security, and (2) made untrue statement of material fact, OR made a misleading
statement of material fact, and omitted or failed to make a statement of material fact necessary to
make the misleading statement made, not misleading. The entirety of the State's case was based
on the alleged sale of American Dairy.com stock, and defendant's alleged failure to make several
disclosures including disclosures of personal information about himself and a Mr. James
Johnson. As shown next under Section A, all the disclosures that the State claimed the defendant
failed to make, are not disclosures required to be made under the statute Following, under
Section B, it is shown that the State failed to establish an offer, sale, or purchase of a security by
the defendant foe value.
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A.

The State failed to establish any misleading statements by the defendant
defendant that would be made not misleading by the alleged omissions.

The State presented Exhibit #12, a Federal tax lien against defendant; Exhibits #13, #14,
and #15, tax liens against former co-defendant Mr. Johnson; Exhibit #16 is a notice of default in
a civil case by MNSTR against defendant and Mr. Johnson; a civil judgment by a Mr. Giffen
allegedly against defendant and Mr. Johnson. See TT pp. 77-78 and pages 146-155.
Additionally, the State claimed that defendant failed to provide financial statements of American
Dairy.com which had never operated nor had any assets up to August 9,2000, it's financial
status, its board of directors, and the risks involved. See TT p. 125. These tax liens, law suits,
judgments, financial statements, board of directors and risks are among several disclosures that
the government claimed were required to be made by the defendant under the above statute.
Through Mr. Myers, the State re-emphasized defendant's alleged failure to disclose tax liens, See
TT p. 264; and the alleged risk that the defendant was disbarred in 1989, and has a half million
tax lien, and civil judgments. See TT pp. 272-274. Indeed, the State's case is based on
defendant's failure to make at least 20 disclosures as set forth in paragraph 28 of the Statement
of the Facts above.
The State, however, failed to establish what misleading statements of material facts did
the defendant make that would be made not misleading by any of the numerous alleged omitted
statements. In fact, the State's witnesses, including its expert witness, all agreed that there were
no misleading statements made by the defendant. Mr. Young admitted that defendant did not
make any misleading statements:
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Q
[SCHWENKE]
Now can you tell me [defendant] what misleading
statement did I make that would be made not misleading by the notice of federal
tax lien against me What statement did I make9 What misleading statement did
I make that would be made not misleading by giving you the information about
the federal tax hen7
A
[YOUNG]
I don't remember you making a statement about that
Q
[SCHWENKE]
.
Exhibit #12 is a lien against - - a federal tax hen - tax hen against Mr Johnson Now isn't it true that I [defendant] did not make
any misleading statement that would be made not misleading by that information
- - by that tax hen9
A
[YOUNG]
I don't remember you making any statement about your
solvency or not, other than saying you had investors available
Q
[SCHWENKE]
Okay So your testimony is you don't remember that
defendant making any misleading statement to you9
A:
[YOUNG]
that's
Q:
[SCHWENKE;;
That would be make - A:
[YOUNG]
That's true
Q[SCHWENKE]
- - not misleading All right Now Exhibit #14 is a
similar thing, another tax lien against Mr Jamis Johnson Now again what misleading
statement did me, the defendant, say to you that would be made not misleading by that
tax hen against Mr Johnson9
A:
[YOUNG]
Nothing, that I remember
SeeTT pp 194-195 (Emphasis added)

Mr Myers also admitted that defendant did not make

any misleading statements of material facts that could be made not misleading by the alleged
omissions
Q:
[SCHWENKE]
Now again, see if you can remember - - think back
What statement - - misleading statement did I [defendant] make to you that would be
made not misleading by the information that was not told you9
A
[MYERS]
It was just the absence of disclosures
See TT P 266 (Emphasis added) Even the State's expert witness admitted that the witnesses
did not give any misleading statements of material facts made by defendant On cross
examination, the State's expert, Mr Hines, confirmed the lack of misleading statements
Q:

[HARMON] In the testimony that you heard, was there ever any testimony that
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you would treat as a misleading statement that Mr. Schwenke made in connection with
the sale of this stock?
A:
[HINES]
Yes
Q:
[HARMON] Could you tell what misleading statement he made?
A:
[HINES]
I remember the - - well, if my memory is correct,
Mr. Schwenke - - okay, now let me correct that. The testimony was that Mr.
Johnson was introduced as an attorney.
Q:
[HARMON] Yes
A:
[HINES]
And that fact actually was true at the time. He was under
disciplinary action. Now I remember. Now I remember the testimony that Mr.
Schwenke said that he had been an attorney and that he no longer was practicing law and
was doing this for a business, so let me correct myself on that. I don't remember that
misstatement.
Q:
[HARMON] Okay. So did you hear, then, any misstatement made by Schwenke
to either Mr. Myers or Mr. Young?
A:
[HINES]
I don't remember any misscat^mu^ *hat Mr. Schwenke
made.
See TT pp. 289 -290. (Emphasis added).
Under the plain meaning of the statute, the State has two ways to prove its case. The
State can prove its case under the first prong of the statute by establishing untrue statements of
material facts made by the defendant or under the second prong, the State can prove its case by
proving two statements: one made, and one omitted. Under the second prong, the State must
prove the first statement which is a statement of material fact actually made by the defendant,
then the State much prove the second statement which is a statements of material fact the
defendant omitted to make. With at least 20 alleged omissions, it is clear that the State elected to
use the second prong, based on alleged omissions of material facts, to establish its case of
security fraud.5 Accordingly, the State must prove a statement made and the statement omitted.
What is the statement made by the defendant? To answer that question we need to look
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at the purpose the statute provides for the State to prove the second or omitted statement. The
statute is clear that the omitted statement would make the first statement not misleading. It
follows, therefore, that the first statement must be a misleading statement that the second and
omitted statement would make not misleading. Therefore, to prove its case, the State must first
establish a misleading statement actually made by the defendant. Only after establishing that
misleading statement can the State then prove the second statement which is the one that the
defendant failed to make, but should have made to make the first and misleading statement, not
misleading.
The State clearly failed to establish the first statement as admitted to by its witnesses
including its expert. Both Mr. Young and Mr. Myers admitted that defendant did not make any
misleading statements. The State's expert Mr. Hines admitted that there were no misleading
statements made by the defendant Mr. Hines clearly acknowledged that neither Mr. Young nor
Mr. Myers stated any misleading statements made by the defendant.
Q:
A:

[HARMON] Could you tell what misleading statement he made?
[HINES]
I remember the - - well, if my memory is correct,
Mr. Schwenke - - okay, now let me correct that. The testimony was that Mr.
Johnson was introduced as an attorney.
Q:
[HARMON] Yes
A:
[HINES]
And that fact actually was true at the time. He was under
disciplinary action. Now I remember. Now I remember the testimony that Mr.
Schwenke said that he had been an attorney and that he no longer was practicing law and
was doing this for a business, so let me correct myself on that. I don't remember that
misstatement.
Q:
[HARMON] Okay. So did you hear, then, any misstatement made by Schwenke
to either Mr. Myers or Mr. Young?
A:
[HINES]
I don't remember any misstatements that Mr. Schwenke
5

The Court also acknowledged that the State did not prove any untrue statements: "I think that they haven't
pointed out any untrue statement, . . ." TT p. 298.
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made.
See TT p. 290. (Emphasis added). Because no misleading statement of material facts made by
defendant has been identified and established, all alleged omissions are left hanging without any
statements actually made by the defendant to attach to. That is a gaping hole in the State's case.
Without misleading statements of material facts that could be made not misleading by omissions
alleged by the State, there could not be a violation of the statute by the defendant as charged.
B.

The State failed to establish an offer, sale, or purchase of a security
by the defendant and for value.

As quoted above, Section 61-1-1 requires that the State must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant engaged in an offer, sale or purchase of a security for value.
Accordingly, there can be no crime of security fraud unless the defendant offered, sold or
purchased any security. What is a security? The State charged that the stock of American
Dairy.com possessed by Mr. Young and Mr. Myers and as reflected in the August 9, 2000
agreement was security as contemplated in the statute.
Q:
[GUNNIARSON]
What is - - what makes a stock a security?
A:
[HINES]
. . For a transaction to be a security that's called
stock, it requires normal characteristics of stock. Those normally are the right to vote, the
ability to hypothecate or lend against the stock that you now possess, your right to
participate in dividends if they're ever offered, and the ability of that stock to be able to
appreciate in value.
Q:
[GUNNARSON]
So in your opinion, if I were to show you a document and
have someone testify, "I took this stock certificate anticipating profit and I had the right
to vote," would those be indications of a stock, a true security?
A:
[HINES]
Yes. The general presumption in the industry is that the
stock certificate normally is a security, almost always, it's a very rare circumstance in
which stock is held not to be a security. But your question was if you have the stock
certificate and you have some of the normal characteristics of stock, then yes, that
transaction is a security.
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See TT pp. 84-85. (Emphasis added).
Notwithstanding, the State's claim that the American Dairy.com stock certificates held by
Mr. Young and Mr. Myers were securities, they were not, as a matter of law. The United States
Supreme Court held that the economic reality6 test is the linchpin of securities analysis. United
House Foundation v. Foreman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336
(1967). This view was also followed recently by a federal court cautioning that "in searching for
the meaning and scope of the word 'security' . . . the emphasis should be on economic reality."
Stechler v. Sidley, Austin, Zicw & Wood LLP, 382 F. Supp. 2d 580 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
Accordingly, Mr. Young and Mr. Myer's receipt of American Dairy.com stock under the August
9, 2000 agreement must be reviewed for its economic reality to determine if the transaction
constituted a sale of security.
The economic reality behind Mr. Young and Mr. Myer's ownership of American
Dairy.com stock under the August 9, 2000 agreement is a mere change of form of the dairy
operation from the limited liability company to a corporation. While Mr. Young and Mr. Myers
were the only shareholders of the corporation, the corporation was recruiting other dairy farms to
participate in the plan. When enough dairy farms participate and become shareholders of
American Dairy.com, it could register a public offering and raise money for the farmers. The
dairy farmers were not selling their dairy farms, rather they were merely changing the form of
ownership of their dairy farms, from whatever it was before, to the corporate form. Mr. Young
6

Please note that the State wrongfully argued to the jury that the "economic reality" test does not apply in this
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confirmed that the transaction in this case was merely a change of form.
Q:
[GUNNARSON]
Was it your desire to merely change the form of ownership
of your dairy farm, put it from an LLC to a corporation?
A:
[YOUNG]
Yeah, I guess so. That's what we were trying to do.
See TT p. 145. (Emphasis added). Moreover, Mr. Young and Mr. Meyer confirmed that the
plan was for several dairy farms to participate in the corporation, and when enough signed up,
the corporation could become a viable company to take to the stock market.
Q:
[GUNNARSON]
What did Mr. Schwenke tell you his concept of American
Dairy.com was?
A:
[YOUNG]
He said he ultimately wanted to get to 10 or 15,000 cows,
several dairies, and basically form a publically Laded ^rrpany.
SeeTTpp. 121-122. (Emphasis added).
Q:
[SCHWENKE]
. . . Now you testified today that the plan that was
explained at the meeting in Fillmore was for several of these struggling farmers like your
farm, would get together and join in the corporation; is that correct?
A:
[YOUNG]
Well, they didn't have to be struggling, but Yes.
Q:
A:

[SCHWENKE]
[YOUNG]

Okay. The idea was not one farm but several farms to - Yes

See TT p. 174 (Emphasis added).
Q:
[SCHWENKE]
Now - - so the plan was not one farm like your farm
but several farmers to come together under the corporation?
A:
[YOUNG]
Yes.
Q:
[SCHWENKE]
If there are enough farmers that are able to come in and
join this corporation, then this corporation could become a viable company to
take to the stock market; wasn't that the plan?
A:
[YOUNG]
Yes.
Q:
[SCHWENKE]
So this idea of the IPO was something that would happen
- - would take place under this plan only after there's enough farmers join the
corporation; is that correct?
case: "You do not apply the economy reality. . . . if you have stock that meets the normal characteristics of stock
that we talked about, then the transaction is a security. See TT p.364.
23

A:
[YOUNG]
I'm sure - - that was one of the requirements, one of the
things that we needed to do before the IPO.
See TT pp. 175-176 (Emphasis added).
Q:
[SCHWENKE]
So you agree, then, there was intention or at least part of
the plan is to have more than one dairy?
A:
[MYERS]
Oh definitely. I mean there was no way the stock would
ever be worth anything with just our dairy alone.
Q:
[SCHWENKE]
You testified here earlier that it was only intended for your
dairy to go public.
A:
[MYERS]
No, no, no. If that was the impression, that's false
Q:
[SCHWENKE]
In fact-A:
[MYERS]
It would - - to do a public offering, it would have been
that the stock was going to go. It wasn't that my dairy was going to a public off
- - the American Dairy.com stock. When value that that American Dairy had
would have been what would have gone public, in my opinion. I don't
understand stock.
Q:
[SCHWENKE]
You do believe then that was something that was an
objective to accomplish in the future that somehow we would hope that by
sometime in the future we would have enough cows, enough farms joining the
corporation here, then we'll look into going into a public offering; is that
correct?
A:
[MYERS]
Yes
Q:
[SCHWENKE]
So this idea of the IPO was something that would happen
- - would take place under this plan only after there's enough farmers join the
corporation; is that correct?
A:
[MYERS]
That would be cor - - that would be correct.
See TT pp. 257-258. (Emphasis added).
As the plan got organized, the corporation would hold record title, the farmers, consistent
with the plan, would continue to control and run their own dairy farms, keeping the cash flow,
like they have always had as confirmed by Mr. Young;
Q:
[SCHWENKE]
You continued to operate and control your farm and do
everything you had being doing with the farm for - - let me rephrase that. At
the meeting it was explained that the farmers would continue to own, control - to control and run, operate their own farms; is that correct?
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A:

[YOUNG]

Yes

See TT p. 182 (Emphasis added).
As the evidence confirms, the economic reality of the transaction in this case was clearly
a future plan for dairy farmers to join the corporate entity, American Dairy.com, and only when
enough farmers participated and place their cows and farm assets into the corporation, would the
corporation prepare to enter the stock market and raise funds for the farmers. While the
corporation holds record title, each farmer retains actual control and run his own operations as
before. There was no change in the properties and dairy operations other that the dairies would
be cleaned and painted; an Internet server, a website and cameras installed, so the dairies and
their operations could be viewed live over the Internet. See TT pp. 189-190.
There simply was no offer, sale or purchase of American Dairy.com stock. The stock
certificates held by Mr. and Mr. Myers under the August 9, 2000 agreement reflected that they
were the only shareholders and the plan was not yet a reality. If more farmers had participated
than the stock certificates would account for each farmer's interest in the corporation. As
confirmed by Mr. Young, and consistent with the future plan, he retained control and ran the
operations of his farm like he had always done prior to entering the August 9, 2000 agreement.
If the com stock market had not crashed, and if a good number of farmers signed up with the
corporation, and American Dairy.com became a viable company to take to the stock market, the
farmers who own the corporation could install officers with immaculate reputations, retain a
reputable underwriter and expert market makers and take their corporation, American Dairy.com,
to the stock market to raise themselves money. But that plan was well in the future. That was
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the economic reality and the reason this venture was undertaken by the defendant.
Finally, the statute requires that the offer or sale must be for value. Mr. Young confirmed
that the transaction in this case was not a sale of stock for value, but instead, it was a change in
the form of ownership from a limited liability company, Milk King Dairy, LLC, to a corporation,
American Dairy.com.
Q:
[GUNNARSON]
Was it your desire to merely change the form of ownership
of your dairy farm, put it from an LLC to a corporation?
A:

[YOUNG]

Yeah, 1 guess so. That's what we were trying to do.

See TT p. 145. (Emphasis added). There was no offer or sale of stock for value, but merely a
change of form from a limited liability company to a corporation. Yet, defendant has been
convicted and imprisoned for doing so. This court is respectfully urged to correct this injustice
and reverse defendant's wrongful conviction and order his freedom.
Point Two
The State's expert witness gave impermissible legal opinion
Rule 704, Utah Rules of Evidence provides,
(a) Except as provided in subparagraph (b), testimony in the form of an
opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it
embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact, (b) No expert witness
testifying with respect to the mental or condition of a defendant in a criminal case may
state an opinion or inference as to whether the defendant did or did not have the mental
or condition constituting an element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such
ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact alone.
This rule clearly guards against expert witnesses telling the jury what the law is, thus duplicating
the judge's statement of the law. Steffenson v. Smith's Mgmt Corp., 862 P.2d 1342, 1347 (Utah
1993), Specht v. Jensen, 853 F. 2d 805, 807 (10th Cir. 1988) (En banc) ["It would be a waste of
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time if witnesses or counsel should duplicate the judge's statement of the law, and it would
intolerably confound the jury to have it stated differently." (Emphasis added)]. Moreover, the
rule guards against the expert witness testifying and utell[ing] the jury what result to reach 'or'
give legal conclusions." Davidson v. Prince, 813 P.2d 1225, 1230, 1231 (Ut. Ct. App 1991)
(Emphasis added).
The State's expert witness, Mr. Hines, clearly give impermissible legal conclusion base
on the facts as testified to by Mr. Young and Mr. Myers. Rules 702 through 704 controls the
proper use and application of expert testimonies. Rule 704 prohibits opinion testimonies that
"tell the jury what result to reach 'or' give legal conclusions." Davidson v. Prince, 813 P.2d
1225, 1230, 1231 (Ut. Ct. App 1991) (Emphasis added), quoting Owen v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,
698 F.2d 236, 240 (5th Cir. 1983). See also State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 428 (Utah 1986) ["It
is the duty of the judge to instruct the jury on relevant law."]. Furthermore, there is "a danger
that a juror may turn to the [witness's legal conclusion] rather than the judge for guidance on the
applicable law. Steffensen, supra. @ 1348. While there is no bright line separating permissible
and impermissible expert opinion testimonies, the Utah Supreme court has provided guidance as
to what is impermissible. In Specht, supra at 806, the Utah Supreme Court held that it is
impermissible for the expert to "state his views of the law which governs the verdict and opine
whether defendant's conduct violated the law." (Emphasis added). Also see State v. Tenney,
913 P. 2d 750, 756 (Ut. Ct. App. 1996) [Concluding that admission of testimony was erroneous
because witnesses "tie[d] their opinions to the requirements of Utah law" (Emphasis added)];
Davidson, supra at 31-32 [Holding that trial court properly excluded, as impermissible
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conclusion, testimony that defendant was negligent.]; and State v. Stringham, 957 P.2d 602, 6078 (Ut Ct. App. 1998) [Holding that it was reversible error for the trial court to allow testimony by
Internal Revenue Service agent regarding the lawfulness of defendant's activities. (Emphasis
added].
A recent illustration of this prohibition is found in State v. Davis, 155 P.3d 909 (Ut. Ct.
App. 2007). In that case, the applicable statute, in part, proscribed possession of a firearm. The
officer testified and offered an impermissible opinion that defendant had possession because he
admitted that his fingerprints would be on the gun.
Q:
[PROSECUTOR]:
Did [Davis'] own statements such as "my fingerprints
will be on [the gun], did that come to play?
A.
[SEEGMILLER]:
It did.
Q:
[PROSECUTOR]:
Why is that?
A:
[SEEGMILLER]:
Well, this reference he made was spontaneous that his
fingerprints would be on it. My understanding of that statute is if his fingerprints
are on it that obviously means he had handled it.
Q:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:
Objection, your honor. His testifying what his
understanding of the statute is is inappropriate.
R:
[THE COURT]:
Overruled, Counsel. You brought it up in your cross.
[The prosecutor] has an opportunity to further explore it. . . .
A:
[SEEGMILLER]:
As he said they were on there, if they were, and they - he
says they were. His claim was, "YouTI find my fingerprints", it's an automatic that he
had it in his hands. So that to us - our understanding again of that is the possession is to
hold and to have it in your hands under your control and that's what we went on.
Davis, supra (Emphasis added). Because of this testimony, the court held that the officer
applied the fact that the defendant admitted his fingerprint would be on the gun, and improperly
reached a legal conclusion that the defendant had possession. Please also see State v. Stringham,
supra, [The IRS agent testified that the defendant assigned income, than the agent concluded that
the assignment was unlawful tax evasion] Like the Davis and Stringham cases, Mr, Hines for the
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State, testified what a stock is and gave a legal conclusion that the stock certificates given to Mr.
Young and Mr. Myers were securities. Mr. Hines testified as to what makes a stock certificate a
security:
Q:
[GUNNIARSON]
What is - - what makes a stock a security?
A:
[HINES]
. . For a transaction to be a security that's called stock,
it requires normal characteristics of stock. Those normally are the right to vote,
the ability to hypothecate or lend against the stock that you now possess, your
right to participate in dividends if they're ever offered, and the ability of that
stock to be able to appreciate in value.
Q:
[GUNNARSON]
So in your opinion, if I were to show you a document and
have someone testify, "I took this stock certificate anticipating profit, and I had I had the
right to vote," would those be indications of a stock, a true security.
A:
[HINES]
Yes. The general presumption in the industry is that the
stock certificate normally is a security, almost always, it's a very rare circumstance in
which stock is held not to be a security. But you question was if you have the stock
certificate and you have some of the normal characteristics of stock, then yes, that
transaction is a security.
See TT pp. 84-85. (Emphasis added). Mr. Hines concluded that the stock certificates in this
case is security:
[GUNNARSON]
Q:
the right to vote?
A:
[HINES]
[GUNNARSON]
Q:
A:
[HINES]
[GUNNARSON]
Q:
A:
[HINES]
[GUNNARSON]
Q:
present in this case?
A:
[HINES]
the fractionalized ownership

So you've indicated a token, if you will, of securities is
Correct
Was that present in this case?
It appears it was, yes.
The right to expect profit; was that present in this case?
That is — I heard testimony to that effect, yes.
Indications of ownership in the corporation; was that
Well, certainly the stock certificate is indicia of owner - of the corporation.

See TT p. 288 (Emphasis added).7 And more particularly, Mr. Hines concluded that Mr. Young
7

Defense's counsel timely objected to the impermissible legal opinion of the State's expert witness (See TT p.
283) preserving this issue for appeal. See Williams v. Bench, 2008 UT 822 (Ut. Ct. App. 2008).
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and Mr. Myers, the two farmers and the only holders of stock in American Dairy.com received
stock in a "security transaction":
Q:
[GUNNARSON]
Let me give you a hypothetical. Two farmers buy stock in
the corporation, and they were the - at that time (inaudible) they were the only
ones that held stock at the time. Would that still be a security transaction?
A:
[HINES]
Oh certainly, It doesn't change. If they're the only one or
there's a million people, you still offered a security.
See TT p. 102 (Emphasis added)
The State's expert witness, Mr. Hines, like the witnesses in Davis and Stringham, clearly
applied the facts of the rase and then rendered an impermissible legal conclusion. Mr. Hines
testified that the two farmers (Mr. Young and Mr. Myer) bought stock of a corporation
(American Dairy.com), and the stock gave them the right to vote, expect profit, and ownership of
the corporation. Based on those facts, Mr. Hines rendered an impermissible legal conclusion that
the sale of the American Dairy.com stock was a "security transaction". Mr. Hines repeatedly,
throughout his testimony, told the jury that the stock certificates given to Mr. Young and Mr.
Myers were securities. Because the economic reality of the transaction in this case does not
support a finding of a sale of security, as a matter of law, Mr. Hine's impermissible legal
conclusion must have been the reason the jury convicted defendant. Accordingly, defendant
respectfully urge the honorable court to please correct the injustice inflicted on him, and
immediately reverse his wrongful conviction.
Point Three
The State violated the constitution by creating its own law, rather
than applying Utah Code Ann. 61-1-1 as enacted by the legislature.
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The law as charged, 61-1-1(2), is clear as to the scope of the disclosures that are required.
"It is unlawful for any person . . . t o : . . . ( 2 ) . . . omit to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statement made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading." (Emphasis added). The provision is clear that the only disclosures required are
those material facts that would make any misleading statement of fact actually made by the
defendant, not misleading. To comply with the plain meaning of the statute requires the State to
first establish misleading statements of material facts actually made by the defendant, then show
statements of material facts not made or omitted by the defendant, which the defendant should
have made so as to render those misleading statements that were made, not misleading. The
State in this case clearly ignored the first requirement that the State must establish misleading
statements of material facts actually made by the defendant. Instead, the State only focused on
the second part of the statute and listed at least twenty statements that the defendant allegedly
omitted or failed to make.
The State claimed that the defendant was a promoter and control person of American
Dairy.com, and as such, defendant had a duty to make numerous disclosures that a reasonable
prudent investor would want to know.
Q:
[GUNNARSON]
If a promoter who is significantly involved in the sales of
the corporation says, "Do you want to buy stock for I have stock to sell," would
that be considered a predicate statement?
A:
[HINES]
Yes. As soon as he opened the door by offering stock, the
offer of the stock is a predicate statement that requires the disclosure of all
material facts relative to that particular stock issue.

See TT p. 92-93 (Emphasis added) Please also see p. 93. What is a material fact? According to
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the State, a material fact is a fact any reasonable prudent investor would want to know before
making his decision to purchase.
Q:
[GUNNARSON]
. . . Once again, material fact is something that any
investor would what?
A:
[HINES]
It's a fact any reasonable prudent investor would want to
know before they make their decision in purchasing.
See TT. p.90 (Emphasis added). Please also see p.91. According to the State, as soon as
someone offers to sell stock, he is required to disclose all "material facts". The State's view,
however, is clearly contrary to the requirements of Section 61-1-1(2). Rather that disclosing all
facts a reasonable prudent investor would want to know before they make their decision m
purchasing, section 61-1-1(2) only requires disclosures of material facts that would make any
misleading statements actually made by the defendant, not misleading.
But based on the State's erroneous view of the law, the State through Mr. Hines, told the
jury that defendant was a promoter and control person with a duty to made numerous disclosures.
Q:
[GUNNARSON]
Based upon what you're heard today, how would
you define Mr. Schwenke's role?
A:
[HINES]
Well, it's my opinion that Mr. Schwenke acted as
president or corporate officer during a period of time, and was the major
promoter of the sale of the stock making him a control person. . . Then
since he had some ability to control the success or failure of the business
venture, then all material facts that relate to his ability or inability to be
successful in that transaction would need to be disclosed.
See TT p. 286. (Emphasis added). According to the State's erroneous view of the law, the
defendant, as a control person, failed to made numerous disclosures that are clearly not within
the purview and requirements of Section 61-1-1(2) of the code. Mr. Hines told the jury that the
defendant should have made approximately twenty disclosures in connection with the transaction
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in this case. The following are a few of the examples of the disclosures that Mr. Hines told the
jury that the defendant should have made; (See Fact #28 above for a lists of at least 20
disclosures that the State claimed the defendant had a duty to make under the statute.)
(1).

The defendant's civil background,
Q:
[GUNNARSON]
How about civil backgrounds of control persons? Should
they be disclosed?
A:
[HINES]
Any fact dealing with the history of any civil litigation,
criminal litigation, regulatory administrative actions of control persons has to be
disclosed in connection with that offer or sale.

See TT p. 96 (Emphasis added).
(2).

The defendant's tax liens,
Q:
[GUNNARSON]
How about tax liens, would they be necessary to disclose
by a control person?
A:
[HINES]
It is my opinion that a tax lien would certainly be a
material fact that should be disclosed. It demonstrates the ability of the control
person to be subjected to potential civil litigation or the seizure of assets, and
also demonstrates their history of not properly paying taxes.

See TT p. 96 -97 (Emphasis added). Please also see p. 101.
(3)

The defendant's disbarment,
[GUNNARSON]
Would the fact that a control person had been disbarred, in your
opinion, how would that relate to your term poison of the offering?
[HINES]
The first issue I'd want to look at is the reason why the person
was disbarred. If it had anything to do with honesty or trust, then it certainly would be a
fact, in my opinion that should be disclosed.

TT p. 101. (Emphasis added).
Contrary to the State's view, and under the plain meaning of the statute, the disclosures
are limited to material facts necessary to make a misleading statement of material fact actually
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made by the defendant, not misleading. The statute requires the State to first prove a true but
misleading statement of material fact actually made by defendant, then and only then, can the
State show statements of material facts that the defendant omitted to make, but should have made
as to render the statement actually made, not misleading. Rather than staying within the scope of
the statute, the State created its own law and expanded the required disclosures to all that a
"reasonable prudent investor would want to know before they make their decision in
purchasing." The State's erroneous view of the law was successfully argued to the court,
notwithstanding, the court noted that the statute does not define the terms "promoter" and
"control person";
[GUNNARSON]
Your honor, the State's position is the same. Mr. Schwenke in
his motion argued credibility. That's a question for the jury. He argued that there were
no predicate statements. I think we've had abundant testimony as to predicate
statements and the fact of obligations of disclosures, the fact that he was a promoter and
the fact (inaudible) even a promoter that put upon him the duty of all disclosure, which
he breached. The fact that he didn't — he brought up subjects such as risk —
[THE COURT]
Well promoter is not a defined term in the statute.
[GUNNARSON]
No, but (inaudible) definition that he's a control person, and a
control person has that — according to Mr. Hines —
[THE COURT]
Well there's no — control person is not a defined in the statute
either.
[GUNNARSON]
Well true, but then the expert testimony has been that
(inaudible) is he is a control person and a promoter, and they have the duty to disclose.
Beyond that, Mr. Hines has testified, and it's obvious for the jury that there is an
opening of the door when he talked about risk. Once you talk about risk you better tell
all the risks, and that includes conflicts, that includes background. That includes the
risk of the IPO. As a matter of fact, the IPO was, in Mr. Hines' opinion, very probably
would not have been granted, and that's something they should have been told. So by
opening the door and talking about the IPO, he has to tell them the risks involved.

TT pp. 295-297. The State did not stop with the judge, it also argued the same erroneous view
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of the law to the jury:
[GUNNARSON]
You're entitled to know whatever a reasonable person would
consider important. What would be considered important in this case? Risk, once again.
The IPO we talked about. The debt structure. The organization itself, which was just a
paper organization. It had no assets. A lie about the assets.
The background of the individuals.
Johnson, the CEO, tax lien $201,000.
Mr. Johnson, notice of federal tax lien, 160 — or $1,645,000. A million-and-a-half
dollars.
You're a disbarred attorney.
How about the fact that you have a tax lien against you, Mr. Schwenke? I had it right
here in my hand If I recall — and he said approximately a half a million dollars.
See TT pp. 406-408.
Instead of prosecuting defendant under 61-1-1(2), the State created its own law calling
the defendant a promoter and control person, that offered stock, but failed to disclose all facts a
"reasonable prudent investor would want to know before they make their decision in
purchasing." The State changed 61-1-1 from a requirement of disclosures limited to those that
would make any misleading statements made by defendant, not misleading, to disclosures of any
information a reasonable prudent investor would want to know. Obviously, the State can't make
up its own laws to put people in prison. But that is exactly what the State did here, and doing so,
the State has clearly violated defendant's constitutional right to due process, and by infringing on
the powers of the legislature as discussed next.
A.

Constitutional due process violation
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Article 1, Sect 7 of the Utah Constitution provides, "No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law". Due process requires that "the defendant
receive[s] full notice of the charges, the elements, how the defendant's conduct amounts to a
crime . . ." Salazar v. Utah State Prison, 852 P.2d 988, 991 (Utah 1993). Here, the defendant
received notice that he was charged with making misleading statements of material facts, and he
failed or omitted to state material facts necessary to make the misleading statements made, not
misleading. The defendant, however, did not receive any notice of the misleading statements of
material facts that he allegedly made. Moreover, the State failed to establish any evidence of
misleading statements of material facts allegedly made by the defendant. Instead, the State
provided at least 20 facts that defendant allegedly omitted to disclose. Accordingly, the
defendant was denied full notice of the charge and the element of misleading statements of
material facts that he allegedly made. Furthermore, besides failing to provide notice of the
misleading statements, the State changed the law from one that required the defendant to make
limited disclosures of material facts, to one that required the defendant to make unlimited
disclosures that a reasonable prudent investor would want to know. By changing the law, the
defendant was denied full notice of the charge, the elements of the charge and how defendant's
conduct amounts to the crime of security fraud. Id
The Constitutional due process issue in this case can also be reviewed from the
perspective that the statute (Section 61-1-1(2)) is void for vagueness, as applied to the defendant.
In West Valley City v. Street, 849 P.2d 613, 615 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993), the Utah Supreme Court
construed Article I, Section 7 that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
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without due process of law", and provided that "[i]t is a basic principle of due process that an
enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined.". Id. (citing Grayned
v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09(1972); Also see U.S. v. Farris, 614 F.2d 634, 642
(9* Cir. 1979) ("The rule against vague criminal statutes guard against ctrap[ping] the innocent'
and delegation of criminological policy decisions to non legislative bodies."). The statute
provides, in part, that the State must first prove misleading statements of material facts actually
made by the defendant, then the State can prove statements of material facts that would make the
misleading statements, not misleading.
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of
any security, directly or indirectly to: . . .
...
...
(2). . .
...
or omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statement made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading. Utah Code Ann. 61-1-1 (2) (Emphasis added).
Apparently, this provision is vague because the State completely misinterpret it. Instead of a law
with limited scope of disclosures, the State informed the jury that this provision meant that the
defendant should be convicted for failure to disclose all facts a "reasonable prudent investor
would want to know before they make their decision in purchasing." TT p.90. The Supreme
Court in West Valley City, supra, admonished that vague laws would "trap the innocent by not
providing fair warning", and allows the State "arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement" of the
law. That is exactly what has happened in this case. The defendant is innocent, yet he has been
convicted of a felony crime because the State has arbitrarily created a law different from the
statute the defendant was charged under.
B.

Constitutional Separation of Powers violation
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The Utah Constitution, Article V, Section 1, provides that u[t]he powers of the
government of the State of Utah shall be divided into three distinct departments, the Legislature,
the Executive and the Judicial; and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly
belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any function appertaining to either of the
others. . .". The legislature, comprising of the House of Representative and the Senate, has the
legislative power. Utah Constitution Article VI, Section 1. Under it's legislative power, the
legislature enacted Utah Code Ann. Section 61-1-1(2) that the defendant was charged with
violating. As enacted by the legislature, Section 61-1-1(2) provided for very limited disclosures
of material facts. The State representing the Executive branch infringed upon the Legislature's
powers, and accordingly, violated the separation of powers clause of the Constitution by creating
its own law expanding the disclosure requirements of Section 61-1-1(2) to all information a
"reasonable prudent investor would want to know before they make their decision in
purchasing". Obviously, the State cannot do so, and doing so in this case has clearly resulted in
the jury wrongfully convicting the defendant for security fraud. Accordingly, the defendant
respectfully urged the honorable court to correct the injustice inflicted upon him, and
immediately reverse his wrongful conviction.
Point Four
Defendant was wrongfully convicted by the court allowing irrelevant
prejudicial, and inflammatory evidence.
The charge of security fraud against defendant was based on an alleged sale of American
Dairy.com stock that closed or completed on August 9, 2000. The statute, Utah Code Ann.
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Section 61-1-1, requires a finding of misleading statements made by defendant in connection
with this alleged August 9, 2000 sale. Additionally, once the misleading statement is
established, the State must then prove statements of material facts that were not made, but should
have been made by the defendant in order to make the misleading statements that were made, not
misleading. Both the misleading and omitted statements must be in connection with the alleged
August 9, 2000 sale agreement.
The three most inflammatory and prejudicial events presented to the jury as evidence in
this case had no bearing or any connection whatsoever to the alleged August 9, 2000 stock sale
agreement. The first is a trust deed for $50,000.00 dated October 16, 2000, over two months
after the allegedagreement. This evidence as shown next in Section A_is false and irrelevant and
very prejudicial. The second is an alleged promise by defendant to pay for 200 cows delivered to
the dairy farm within 30 days after the August 9, 2000 alleged sale agreement. This evidence, as
shown in Section B, is also false, irrelevant and very prejudicial. Additionally, the State's expert
witness gave impermissible and highly inflammatory testimony concerning an IPO that was
irrelevant and very prejudicial. That improper IPO testimony is addressed in Section C.
A.

The evidence of the $50,000 trust deed is false, irrelevant, and very
prejudicial.

The State produced a Notice of Default (Exhibit #10) and Trust deed (Exhibit #9) and
through testimonies of Mr. Young and Mr. Myers made an outrageous claim that defendant took
$50,000.00 from the dairy farm.
Q:
A:

[GUNNARSON]
[YOUNG]

What is that [Exhibit # 10]
It's a notice of default from PDN Investments.
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Q:
[GUNNARSON]
default?
A:
[YOUNG]
Q:
[GUNNARSON]
amount of $50,000.00, is that
A:
[YOUNG]
Q:
[GUNNARSON]
A:
[YOUNG]
See TT p. 163 (Emphasis added)
Q:
[GUNNARSON]
A:
[YOUNG]
See TT p. 164 (Emphasis added).

What did you think when you got a second notice of
I thought it was a mistake.
So you got the notice of default that says its in the
right?
Yes
Can you recall who got the $50,000.00?
Paul [defendant] did

Did he spend any of it on the farm?
No.

Q:
[GUNNARSON]
Did you ever authorized Mr. Schwenke through this proxy,
verbally, orally that he could take $50,000 out of the deed to your farm for his
corporation?
A:
[MYERS]
No, he never — that never — I never dreamed that would
have happened. I didn't think it could happen because I knew that Central Bank had the
first mortgage on that loan. I didn't know he could re- mortgage that again.
Q:
[GUNNARSON]
So he never told you he was going to take $5,000.00
personally out of it; is that correct?
Q:
[MYERS]
Oh $5,000 personally?
G:
[GUNNARSON]
Or $50,000.00
A:
[MYERS]
No, No.
See TT pp. 277-278 (Emphasis added) Contrary to the testimonies, there was no evidence of a
note for $50,000.00, no evidence that the missing note was funded, and no evidence that
defendant took $50,000.00.
Q:
[SCHWENKE]
Okay. As a matter of fact, you don't have a note that in
fact was signed for this alleged loan, and top of that, you don't know if any - even if there was a note, whether there was any money paid on this note, is that
correct?
A:
[YOUNG]
That's true, I don't
SeeTTp. 187. (Emphasis added). In deed, but for ineffective assistance of counsel, bank
records and testimony from PDN Investments would have established that only $12,500.00 was
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funded on the loan. And notwithstanding, Mr. Young's denial of the loan, he personally
received $7,000.00, and the balance of $5,500.00 was paid on a $15,000 bill from cSave.net,
LLC that cleaned, painted the dairy, and installed the internet server, website and cameras
throughout the dairy8 as confirmed by Mr. Young at trial. No funds went to Mr. Schwenke
whatsoever.
Q:

A:
Q:

A:

[SCHWENKE]
When you joined American Dairy.com under the
agreement, your farm, according to the plan, was also then equipped with these
internet equipment, is that correct?
[YOUNG]
Yes
[SCHWENKE]
As a matter of fact, some people came over and
clean the place up and painted, help you with the - - putting a special room.
They installed internet server, computer and stuff. All of that happened is that
correct?
[YOUNG]
Yes

See TT pp. 189-190 (Emphasis added).
The evidence of the loan, and the charge that defendant took $50,000 personally from the
proceeds of the loan is absolutely false.9 Moreover, the loan was made over two months after the
August 9, 2000 alleged sale agreement; and accordingly, it had no bearing or any connection to
alleged stock sale. The loan is therefore, not relevant to the allege security fraud and should not
have been presented to the jury. The loan is not a statement of material fact made by the
defendant in connection with the August 9, 2000 agreement. The loan is not an omission of a

Appellant was denied a remand to establish evidence of the loan including copies of the checks issued to James
Young and cSave.net, LLC and the copies of the checks with the court order included herein as Appendix II.
Ineffective assistance of counsel: The defendant was incarcerated in August, 2005 and remained incarcerated at the time of
the trial in this case in June, 2007, and remained so until November 4, 2008. Accordingly, defendant was not available and free
to prepare for the trial. As a result, defendant had to rely on his counsel to properly prepare for trail. Early in the case,
defendant advised his attorney to visit with a Mr. Bitton from Idaho and to subpoena him for the trial. Defendant also asked his
attorney to subpoena all the records of the loan from PDN Investments. At the morning of trial, defendant was told by his
attorney that Mr. Bitton was not coming to the trial, and the PDN Investments record were not subpoenaed. As a result of
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material fact that would have made any misleading statement made by the defendant on or before
August 9, 2000, not misleading. The allegation and the false evidence that defendant took
$50,000 from the farm is inflammatory and extremely prejudicial that it must have caused the
jury to wrongfully convict the defendant. Therefore, this court is respectfully urged to please
correct this miscarriage of justice and restore defendant's freedom by reversing and vacating
defendant's wrongful conviction.
B.

The evidence that defendant promised to pay for the 200 cows is false,
irrelevant inflammatory and very prejudicial.

After the August 9, 2000 agreement, approximately 200 cows were delivered to the dairy.
The State through Mr. Young claims that defendant told Young to buy the cows, and defendant
failed to pay for them.
Q:
A:
Q:
A:

[SCHWENKE]
Okay. You testified today that defendant told you to
go and buy 200 cows to put in the dairy; is that correct?
[YOUNG]
Yes,
[SCHWENKE]
Then the defendant didn't pay for the cows, and they
got repossessed, is that correct?
[YOUNG]
Yes

See TT p. 192 (Emphasis added). While Mr. Young claims that defendant was supposed to pay
for the cows, he acknowledge that defendant did not promise, or had any obligation under the
August 9, 2000 agreement to buy cows.
Q:
[SCHWENKE]
. . . It [the August 9, 2000 agreement] doesn't say
anything about defendant having or promising or having any obligation to go buy cows
for this farm; is that correct?
A:
[YOUNG]
That's correct.
See TT p. 192 (Emphasis added). According to the State, within 30 days after the August 9, 2000
counsel's failure to obtain the PDN Investment records, defenda42 was unable to establish the evidence of the loan at trial.

agreement, the cows were delivered to the farm, and during the next 30 days the cows were
repossessed. See TT pp. 243-244. When the cows were repossessed, the dairy was over.
Q:
[GUNNARSON]
Were they ["cows] ever repossessed?
A:
[MYERS]
Yes
Q:
[GUNNARSON]
What happened to the finances of the farm after the cows
were taken back?
A:
[MYERS]
It was over. I mean we were struggling before this
transaction. We had put, I don't know, three months of feed into these cows, we
had calved them all out, just barely starting to get some milk flow out of them to
where they would have probably broke even and they were gone, and we were
done. I mean it was over.
See TT pp. 244-245 (Emphasis added).
The State put the blame on the defendant for the loss of the dairy farm. In deed, it must
have inflamed the jury enough to find defendant guilty of a crime he did not commit. Moreover,
the claim is clearly irrelevant. Defendant's allege promise to pay for the cows, even if it was
made, was not made until after the August 9, 2000 allegedstock sale agreement. Therefore, it
could not have been a misleading statement of a material fact made by defendant in connection
with the August 9, 2000 sale agreement. Furthermore, assuming arguendo, that defendant made
misleading statements, the promise to pay for the cows could not be a statement of material fact
that defendant omitted to make on or before August 9, 2000 that could make any misleading
statement, not misleading. The prejudicial impact of this evidence, however, is plain and clear
and must have caused the jury to convict defendant. Accordingly, this court is again respectfully
urged, for this additional ground, to reverse and vacate the defendant's wrongful conviction.
C

The State's expert witness gave impermissible testimony concerning an IPO
that was irrelevant, inflammatory and very prejudicial.
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This case does not involve an Initial Public Offering ("IPO") of stock. Indeed, even the
court acknowledged that the case does not involve an IPO:
[HARMON]
You honor, again I'd like to pose an objection because I think that
we're going far a field to the facts of this case.
[GUNNARSON]
You honor, if I may respond.
[THE COURT]
Go ahead.
[GUNNARSON]
Your honor, if nothing else, this is foundational.
I have
documents here that I'm going to have to admit sooner or later. This foundational. It
goes right to the heart of the case.
[THE COURT]
Well, this case does not involve an IPO does it Mr. Gunnarson?
TT p. 100 (Emphasis added.). Yet, prior to Mr. Harmon's objection, the State has presented
outrageously inflammatory testimony concerning an IPO and implying that the defendant in tnis
case failed to make the disclosures required to sell stock, and that the sale of stock in this case
was poisoned by defendant's disbarment:
Q:
[GUNNARSON]
Are you familiar with the term initial public offering?
A:
[HINES]
Yes.
Q:
[GUNNARSON]
What is - is it call and IPO?
A:
[HINES]
Yes, that's an IPO.
Q:
[GUNNARSON]
IPO.
A:
[HINES]
Right.
Q:
[GUNNARSON]
Don't want to be too confusing (inaudible) I could never
speak military because they have too may acronyms, so I'll continue to call it an
initial public offering, okay? What is necessary for someone to obtain — well,
first of all, what is an initial public offering? How does it come about?
A:
[HINES]
That is the initial introduction of the stock from the issuer
to the general public.
Q:
[GUNNARSON]
What is necessary in order for the issuer to introduce
stock to the general public?
A:
[HINES]
The issuer is going to have to either do a registration or
find some circumstances under which they are exempt from registration. The
majority of the ones we're seeing now fall under what's call 506 (inaudible)
offerings. After they handle their registration issues, if we assume it's an
offering with a company that has $25 million or less in income, they could
qualify for SB-10 regulations, and they then will need to find an underwriter to
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sell those stocks.
The duty of the underwriter is - normally is to take the entire quantity of
stock and to sell it in the secondary market, but an underwriter can also elect to
take part of that stock and sell it and not take the risk of possessing all the stock.
Q:
[GUNNARSON]
What I hear you saying - tell me if I'm wrong — is that an
underwriter sells so that he sponsors the stock?
A:
[HINES]
That's correct.
Q:
[GUNNARSON]
What is — in your experience, what is necessary for an
underwriter to know in order to determine whether or not that person will
sponsor the stock and present it to the public?
A:
[HINE]
Well, what an underwriter is going to do is tremendous
amount of basically boilerplate due diligence concerning the requirements for
disclosure, including risk, capitalization, distribution, commissions to be paid,
background of the principals and control persons involved in the issuing
company.
Q:
[GUNNARSON]
Are there times in which an underwriter refuses to
sponsor stock?
A:
[HINES]
Oh, absolutely, yes.
Q:
[GUNNARSON]
What would the reasons, in your experience, be that
would happen?
A:
[HINES]
Well, certainly if there's — an underwriter may put a lot of
weight on the fact that there's so much competition in the market doing the very
same thing that it is unlikely he can sell the stock. Well, certainly one of the
areas that underwriters look at that the industry recognizes poisoning the issue is
if there is significant discipline history or other history of principals involved
and control persons involved in the issuing of the stock, then underwriters
know that those facts have to be disclosed to potential investors, and so they'll
have a tendency to back down from those offerings.
Q:
[GUNNARSON]
Would those - now you use the term "poison." What do
you mean by A:
[HINES]
That's an industry term that we use in our NASA
meetings.
Q:
[GUNNARSON]
Which means what?
A:
[HINES]
Basically it's probably going to bar an underwriter from
taking that to a secondary market and selling that stock. They're not going to
sell it and they're going to turn down this underwriting because of that fact.
Q:
[GUNNARSON]
Is there a registration document that must be filled out?
A:
[HINES]
Well, depending on whether you're filing for an
exemption from registration or are registering the product yourself, the majority
of the transactions states deal with are exempt transactions, and so they don't
have to file registration. They may have to file some notice with the State,
45

though.
Q:
[GUNNARSON]
Coming back to your idea of poison, there were two
words, poison something.
A:
[HINES]
Poison the offering
G:
[GUNNARSON]
Poison - three words, poison the offering. Poisoning the
offering, you indicated there were certain thing that an underwriter would consider very
serious. Give me an idea of what those things would be. How about tax liens on the
control person of the corporation. Would that be considered?
See TT pp. 97-100. (Emphasis added). And even after Mr. Harmon's objection, the court still
allowed State to continue with irrelevant IPO testimony, and even stating that defendant's
disbarment poisoned the offering in this case.
Q:
[GUNNARSON]
Would the fact that a control person had been disbarred,
in your opinion, how would that relate to your term poison of the offering?
A:
[HINES]
The first issue I'd want to look at is the reason why the
person was disbarred. If it had anything to do with honesty or trust, then it
certainly would be a fact, in my opinion, that should be disclosed.
Q:
[GUNNARSON]
Tax liens?
A:
[HINES]
Tax liens of the control person, again, I think are very
important facts for an investor to know and to give them - the investor can give
that fact the amount of weight that they think it deserves, but it's my opinion that
it should be disclosed.
See TT p. 101. The court also allowed the State to continue with irrelevant IPO questions when
the State questioned Mr. Drage.
Q:
A:
Q:

[GUNNARSON]
Let's talk about the IPO, the initial public offering.
[DRAGE]
Yes sir.
[GUNNARSON]
You indicated that if there is an initial public offering
there has to be tremendous disclosures, right?
A:
[DRAGE]
Yes, at the time of the IPO.
Q:
[GUNNARSON]
Okay. That would have included Mr. Schwenke's
disbarment?
A:
[DRAGE]
I don't know, It didn't happen, so «
Q:
[GUNNARSON]
No, I'm just talking about - you know how an IPO
works?
A:
[DRAGE]
Perfectly.
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Q:
[GUNNARSON]
Okay. In that case, if there had been an IPO, it would
have disclosed Mr. Schwenke 's disbarment, correct?
A:
[DRAGE]
If there had been an IPO on August 12th or 18th, whenever
they signed it, yeah.
Okay. It would have had to disclose his tax liens, correct?
[GUNNARSON]
Q
I'd have to take a look at that. Maybe not the tax liens.
[DRAGE]
A
Mr. Schwenke or Mr. Johnson's tax liens of over a
[GUNNARSON]
Q
m illion dollars?
A
[DRAGE]
Maybe no.
[GUNNARSON]
He signed as the CEO of the corporation.
Q
[DRAGE]
You're asking me about if an IPO took place, but there —
A
an IPO didn't take place.
Q:
[GUNNARSON]
Okay. Hypothetical, there was an IPO issued, okay.
Would the issuer had been informed about Mr. Schwenke's disbarment?
A:
[DRAGE]
If the issuer hac1 H°ne an IPO they wouldn't have them as
officers, probably.
Because they would know about that, correct?
Q:
[GUNNARSON]
To
- well, for ~ to make sure that there weren't any legal
A:
[DRAGE]
entanglements.
Exactly, It's important in an IPO to give all the
Q:
[GUNNARSON]
backgrounds of the principals, correct?
At the time of the IPO.
A:
[DRAGE]
Yes.
Q:
[GUNNARSON]
Yes
A:
[DRAGE]
Does it include the disbarment?
Q:
[GUNNARSON]
A:
[DRAGE]
It could, yes.
Q:
[GUNNARSON]
Would it have included the disciplinary proceeding
against Mr. Johnson —
No.
A;
[DRAGE]
— and his bar?
Q:
[GUNNARSON]
No.
A:
[DRAGE]
Would you have included tax loan — or liens?
Q:
[GUNNARSON]
I'd have to analyze that. Possibly not.
A:
[DRAGE]
Probably so, in your experience?
Q:
[GUNNARSON]
I'd have to re-read it
A:
[DRAGE]
Okay. How about civil judgments against one of the
Q:
[GUNNARSON]
principals?
Only if it involved issue of honesty. In other words, it
A:
[DRAGE]
could be a DUI. It's just not going to be an item.
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Q:
[GUNNARSON]
Civil judgment of a substantial amount?
A:
[DRAGE]
Well, I mean he might have violated a ~ I don't know.
He could have broken - breached a contract. That doesn't necessarily mean that
that's something that has to be disclosed.
Q:
[GUNNARSON]
Financial status has to be disclosed, correct?
A:
[DRAGE]
No
Q:
[GUNNARSON]
Financial status doesn't - A:
[DRAGE]
Of an individual? No. Only bankruptcy. If there's been a
bankruptcy filed in the last five years.
Q:
[GUNNARSON]
An underwriter wouldn't be interested to know that one of
the principals has a judgment over their head for so many hundreds of thousands
of dollars?
A:
[DRAGE]
Well (inaudible) an underwriter might want to know, but
it's not required to be put in there. The statutory requirement is that if there's
been a bankruptcy in the last five years then you disclose it, otherwise there's not
a disclosure.
Q;
[GUNNARSON]
The purpose of having an underwriter is the underwriter
looks at the initial public offering and makes sure that all the proper disclosures
are there, correct?
A:
[DRAGE]
No, the purpose of the underwriter is to go get the money.
Q:
[GUNNARSON]
Okay, but he's also responsible for making sure that all
the disclosures are there or he wouldn't underwrite it?
A:
[DRAGE]
They are also responsible for the disclosures, correct.
Q:
[GUNNARSON]
Right, or they wouldn't underwrite it.
A:
[DRAGE]
Correct.
Q:
[GUNNARSON]
And those disclosures would be anything that an investor
would think significant or important in making their decision as to whether to
invest, correct.
A:
[DRAGE]
They would analyze it that way.
Q:
[GUNNARSON]
Okay. The background[HARMON]
I'd like to object at this point to this whole line of
questioning because we're talking about hypothetical and we're talking about an
IPO. There's never been any proof in this case that there ever was an IPO.
[GUNNARSON]
Your honor, may - I'm sorry.
[THE COURT]
Go ahead, Mr. Gunnarson.
[GUNNARSON]
If the jury finds that there was more than just a mere
change of ownership, then they're entitled to go into every misrepresentation and
every omission from there. That's a question of the jury. Just because it was not
issued doesn't mean that they can't consider it.
[THE COURT]
Overruled. I find it to be a proper hypothetical. Go
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ahead.
TT PP 357-360 (Amphasis added)
By overruling the objection, the court allowed the jury to consider the repeated
misstatement of the law by Mr. Gunnarson, ["If the jury finds that there was more than just a
mere change of ownership, then they're entitled to go into every misrepresentation and every
omission from there." TT p.360 (Emphasis added).]10 and accept as evidence the State's frequent
statement that the defendant's disbarment, his tax liens and judgments must be disclosed.
State's unlawful tactics must not be allowed and this court is respectfully urged correct this
miscarriage of justice and reverse the conviction. The law is clear that the only disclosures
required under 61-1-1(2) are those that would make a misleading statement made by the
defendant, not misleading rather than disclosures of all facts a reasonable prudent investor would
want to know.
CONCLUSION
The State charged defendant with violation of Utah Code Ann. Section 61-1-1(2), but
prosecuted him with a completely different version of the statute. Section 61-1-1(2) requires
proof that defendant made misleading statements of material facts, and failed to make statements
of material facts that would make the misleading statements that he made, not misleading. The
State failed to establish any misleading statements made by the defendant, instead, the State told
the jury of as many as 20 disclosures that the defendant omitted to make. Without misleading
statements made by defendant, the jury was left with 20 or so omissions without any misleading
10

Gunnarson 4s argument is frivolous because Mr. Young testified that the transaction was a mere change of form
of the business from a limited liability company to a corporation.
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statements to attach to. That is a major hole in the State's case and a reason for the court to
reverse the defendant's conviction. Additionally, the economic reality of the issuance of
American Dairy.com stock, confirms that there had been no offer or sale of a security in this case
as charged by the State. United House Foundation v. Foreman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975). On top of
it all, there was no offer or sale of security for value as Mr. Young confirmed that the
transaction was merely a change of form of the business from a limited liability company to a
corporation.
Moreover, the State's expert gave impermissible legal conclusion that the American
Dairy.com stock issued to Mr. Young and Mr. Myers was security. That impermissible legal
opinion compels reversal of the defendant's conviction. State v. Davis, 155 P.3d 909 (Ut. Ct.
App. 2007). Couple with an impermissible legal conclusion, the State also presented the jury
with an erroneous statement of the law claiming that once the defendant offer or sold American
Diary.com stock that he had a duty to disclose all facts a "reasonable prudent investor would
want to know before they make their decision in purchasing." The impermissible legal
conclusion and the erroneous view of the statute are grounds for reversal of the conviction,
accordingly, the defendant respectfully urged the honorable court to do so, and immediately
vacate the wrongful conviction and order defendant's freedom.
Finally, the conviction should be reversed on the additional ground that the court allowed
irrelevant, inflammatory and prejudicial evidence of an allege $50,000.00 loan, repossession of
200 cows, and a non existing initial public offering.
For all the foregoing reasons, appellant respectfully prays the honorable court would
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reverse his wrongful conviction and order his immediate freedom.
Dated this

day of November, 2008.

//

,

A. Paul Schwenke,
Appellant Pro Se

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage pre-paid, a true and exact copy of the foregoing
Brief of Appellant to:
Ms. Kris C. Leonard, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Fl.
P.O. Box 140854
SLC, UT. 84114-0854
this

of November, 2008.

51

ADDENDUM
Table of Content
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, CODE SECTIONS AND RULES
Utah Constitution Articale I, Section 7
Utah Constitution, Article V, Section 1
Utah Constitution Article VI, Section 1
Utah Code Ann. Sect. 61-1-1
Utah Code Ann. Section 76-6-405
Utah Code Ann. Sect. 78A-4-2-103(2)(e)
Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure:
Rule 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence
Rule 704, Utah Rules of Evidence
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO REMAND
Order denying remand
Loan Disbursements:
1.
Checks to Mr. Young
Check No. 2171
Check No. 2173
Total
2.
Checks to cSave.net
Check No. 2181
Check No. 2187
Total
A

$5,000.00
2,000.00
$7,000.00
$5,000.00
$3,000.00
2,500.00
$5,500.00

HUB)
VfftTC

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
f .; P«fS

ooOoo
f-tc. :e G.I: Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee

/\.

:

ORDER DENYING REKAND
C a s e No.

20070659-CA

iiuJ. Schwenfce,
Deie^dant and Appellant.

B*f.-:-)-e Judges Greenwood, Thorne, and Orme.
Thin matter is before the court on Appellant's motion for
rerwv id under rule 2 3B of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
A !•••:• ncmd is available only upon "a nonspeculative allegation of
fact-., rot. fully appearing in the record on appeal, which, if
true., could support a determination that counsel was
ineffective," including facts that show "the claimed deficient
peri ;.rmcmce" and "the claimed prejudice suffered hy the appellant
as; c result of the claimed deficient performance." Utah R. App.
p.

::.

\B

i.&), (b) .

S'cr.wenke's motion asserts that his trial counsel was
iue:l. iective because he failed to: (1} object zo the acm.iss.ion of
a tr ist deed and subpoena bank documents to demonstrate that he
rece .ved no money from the alleged loan; (2) obtain documents and
Cell witnesses regarding the value of the dairy; and (3) subpoena
infc:•-mation as to whether certain individuals may have.received
vicl'.r.s1 reparation funds or promises of compensation that may
have biased their testimony. Schwenke does not provide properly
supported, nonspeculative facts necessary to sustain his
assertions. Thus, his claims do not warrant remand under rule
2313.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion is denied.

>i. ed this

ii

day of September,, 2008.

FO^. 'T-rC C O U R T :

C ::ec 6x y X. Orme, Judge
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